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CASES NOTED
It is difficult to understand why the Florida Supreme Court handed
down a decision abolishing nonsuit in this state and then only twenty-one
days later so drastically revised the rules of civil procedure that Florida
now seems to be pioneering in the extension of the practice of nonsuit.
CHARLENE HERMANN
SEQUESTRATION OF WITNESSES-SHOULD IT BE
GRANTED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT?
The defendant was convicted of robbery and assault with intent to
commit murder. At the trial a detective, who was a spectator, heard the
defendant testify that he had not made an oral confession. After hearing
this, the detective advised the prosecutor that the defendant had in fact
made an oral confession to him. Over defense counsel's objection, the
detective was allowed to testify as to the confession. The defendant col-
laterally attacked the judgment' and moved for a new trial.' Upon the
trial court's denial of his motion, the defendant appealed. On appeal,
held, reversed and remanded for a new trial: allowing a witness to testify
after hearing the defendant's testimony was in violation of the rule
requiring sequestration of witnesses and was an abuse of judicial dis-
cretion. Jackson v. State, 177 So.2d 353 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
Since the Biblical story of Susanna's exoneration, 8 the separation of
witnesses has been regarded as a valuable adjunct to direct and cross
examination of witnesses.' The early English doctrine indicated that
sequestration" is entirely discretionary with the court,6 and with the
1. FLA. R. CRim. P. 1, provides that a prisoner under sentence of a court may col-
laterally attack the court's judgment on the basis that his Constitutional rights were violated.
2. See Jackson v. State, 166 So.2d 194 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
3. Two elders coveted Susanna, a very fair woman and pure, the wife of Joadm;
they tempted her, but she resisted; then they plotted, and charged her with adultery;
and she was brought before the assembly; and the elders said: As we walked in the
garden alone ... a young man ... came unto her, and lay with her. . .. [T]hese
things do we testify. Then the assembly believed them, as those that were the elders
and judges of the people .. .But Daniel, standing in the midst of them said: "Are
ye such fools, ye sons of Israel, that without examination or knowledge of the
truth ye have condemned a daughter of Israel?" [Tihen Daniel said unto them,
"Put these two aside, one far from another, and I will examine them." So when they
were put asunder one from another, he called one of them and said unto him, ...
"now then, if thou hast seen her, tell me under what tree sawest thou them
company together?" who answered, "under a mastick tree. . . " So, he put him
aside and commanded to bring the other, and said unto him . . . . "Now therefore
tell me, under what tree didst thou take them company together?" who answered,
"under an holm tree . . . ." And they arose against the two elders, for Daniel had
convicted them of false witness, by their own mouth. As quoted in 6 WiGWon,
EVIDENCE § 1837 (3d ed. 1940).
4. Braddon, Observations on the Earl of Essex's Murder, 9 How. St. Tr. 1224 (1725);
Cook's Trial, 13 How. St. Tr. 311 (1696); Rosewell's Trial, 10 How. St. Tr. 147 (1684); Sir
Walter Raleigh's Trial, 1 Jardine Crim. Tr. (1603).
5. "Sequestration" is defined as, "the separating or setting aside of a thing in contro-
versy, from the possession of both parties that contend for it." BLAcx, LAW DicTIONARY
1531 (4th ed. 1951).
6. Cook's Trial, supra note 4 at 348. ("It is not necessary to be granted for the ask-
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advent of trial by jury this ancient concept continued in application. 7 The
sequestration of witnesses rule8 crossed the ocean with the common law
and was adopted by early American courts.9
The difficulty of detecting an untruthful witness was appropriately
elucidated by Sir James Stephans when he declared: "Under particular
circumstances no really effectual protection against perjury ever has or
ever can be devised."' 1 Sequestration or "invoking the rule"" is a device
which purports to preserve the truth and detect falsehood at the trial. 2
This purpose is accomplished in three significant ways:
1. It prevents individual witnesses from shaping their testimony to
correspond with that given earlier in the trial.'
ing .. "); Vaughan's Trial, 13 How. St. Tr. 485, 494 (1696). "You cannot insist upon it
as your right but only a favor that we may grant." Accord, Goodere's Trial, 17 How. St. Tr.
1003 (1741).
7. E.g., Canning's Trial, 19 How. St. Tr. 330 (1754); Charnock's Trial, 12 How. St.
Tr. 1396 (1696); Guilliams Trial, 1 Sid. 131 (1665); Earl of Essex's Trial, 1 Jardine Crim.
Tr. 349 (1600); Duke of Norfolk's Trial, 1 Jardine Crim. Tr. 191 (1571).
8. Supra note 5.
9. Wilson v. State, 52 Ala. 299 (1876). (It is discretionary with the court but should
rarely be withheld.); Hubbell v. Ream, 31 Iowa 289 (1871); Porter v. State, 2 Ind. 435
(1850); People v. Duffy, 1 Wheeler Crim. Cases 123 (N.Y. 1923); State v. Sparrow, 3
Murph. 487 (1819).
10. STEPHANS, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 403 (1882).
11. The segregation, sequestration, exclusion, and separation of witnesses are synonymous
with "putting witnesses under the rule" or "invoking the rule." They are all terms which
refer to the same procedure. E.g., Hanson v. United States, 271 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1959);
Charles v. United States, 215 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1954) ; State v. McLeod, 131 Mont. 478,
311 P.2d 400 (1957); State v. Spencer, 239 N.C. 604, 80 S.E.2d 670 (1954) ; State v. Coltone,
53 N.J. Super. 316, 145 A.2d 509 (1958); State v. Williams, 226 S.C. 525, 85 S.E.2d 863
(1955); Bass v. State, 191 Tenn. 259, 231 S.W.2d 707 (1950). See also, 1 GREENLEAF, LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 432 (16th ed. 1899).
12. "The reason for the rule is the occasional readiness of the interested person to adopt
his testimony, when offered later, to victory rather than veracity, so as to meet the
necessities as laid open by prior witnesses." 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1839 (3d ed. 1940).
See generally 4 JONES, EVIDENCE § 889 (5th ed. 1958); 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
§ 840 (12th ed. 1955) ; 1 CHAMBERLAYNE, MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE § 189 (2d ed. 1911) ; 2
BEST, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 636 (Morgans ed. 1876).
13. In United States v. Legget, 326 F.2d 613, 614 (4th Cir. 1964), the court in a per
curiam opinion stated:
The purpose of the exclusion rule is ... to prevent the possibility of one witness
shaping his testimony to match that given by another witness at the trial.
The Tennessee Supreme Court in Nance v. State, 210 Tenn. 328, 330, 358 S.W.2d 327,
329 (1962), declared:
[T]his rule or expedient [sequestration] is designed to detect falsehood as well as
to prevent any witness from coloring his, or her testimony either purposely or
through influence by talking to other witnesses and hearing them talk.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania's opinion in Commonwealth v. Boyance, 199 Pa.
Super. 204, 207, 184 A.2d 338, 341 (1962), expressed the view:
The sole purpose of separating witnesses is to prevent the shaping of testimony to
correspond with that given earlier in the trial.
In State v. Goff, 174 Neb. 548, 555, 118 N.W.2d 625, 632 (1962), the Nebraska Supreme
Court declared:
The practice of causing unexamined witnesses ... to be sequestered, so that they
may not hear the testimony of the witness being examined, is a good one, as it tends
to elicit the truth, and promote the ends of justice.
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2. It helps to determine whether witnesses are telling stories which
would indicate coaching, memorizing, or the complete fabricating
of testimony. 4
3. It is easier to trap the potential perjurer who has not heard prior
testimony. 15
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions hold that the exclusion-
ary rule is a matter of judicial discretion.'" Only Georgia has unequivo-
Justice Thornal, delivering the majority opinion of the Florida Supreme Court in
Spencer v. State, 133 So.2d 729, 731 (Fla. 1961), stated:
The obvious reason for the rule is to avoid the coloring of a witness's testimony by
that which he has heard from other witnesses who have preceded him on the stand.
Accord, e.g., Charles v. United States, 215 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1954) ; Witt v. United States,
196 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1952) ; Hood v. United States, 23 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1927) ; Roberts
v. State, 122 Ala. 47, 25 So. 238 (1859) ; State v. Pell, 104 Iowa 655, 119 N.W. 154 (1909) ;
Moore v. Commonwealth, 323 S.W.2d 577 (Ky. 1958); Pool v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky.
107, 213 S.E.2d 603 (1948); State v. Carter, 206 La. 181, 19 So.2d 41 (1944); State v.
Brassard, 202 La. 458, 12 So.2d 218 (1942); Pribyl v. State, 165 Neb. 691, 87 N.W.2d 201
(1957); Commonwealth v. Lomax, 196 Pa. Super. 5, 173 A.2d 710 (1961); Hudalson v.
State, 191 Va. 400, 61 S.E.2d 276 (1950).
14. See Note, 11 KAN. L. REV. 410 (1963); Goldstein, The Exclusion (Separation) of
Witnesses, TRAL LAw GuIDE 341 (1961).
15. Professor Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence, set forth the proposition:
There is no reason for a distinction between civil and criminal cases; successful
perjury is an equally deplorable result in whatever form it overwhelms its victims.
6 WI GmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1839 (3d ed. 1940).
See generally Goldstein, supra note 13; Nance v. State, supra note 12.
16. It should be noted that while the majority of states hold that sequestration is
discretionary with the court, the various jurisdictions differ as to what constitutes an abuse
of discretion. E.g., Beddow v. State, 39 Ala. App. 29, 96 So.2d 175 (1956) ; Dickens v.
State, 398 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1965); Bellamack v. State, 37 Ariz. 344, 294 P. 622 (1930);
Williams v. State, 375 S.W.2d 375 (Ark. 1964) ; People v. Lopez, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424, 60 Cal.
2d 223, 384 P.2d 16 (1963) ; Jordan v. People, 393 P.2d 745 (Colo. 1964) ; State v. Pikul,
150 Conn. 195, 187 A.2d 442 (1962) ; Spencer v. State, 133 So.2d 729 (Fla. 1961) ; State v.
Miller, 26 Ill. 2d 305, 186 N.E.2d 317 (1962) ; Walhen v. State, 204 N.E.2d 526 (Ind. 1964) ;
State v. Sampson, 220 Iowa 142, 261 N.W. 769 (1935) ; State v. Smit, 184 Kan. 582, 337
P.2d 680 (1959); Rice v. Commonwealth, 387 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. 1965); State v. McAllister,
244 La. 42, 150 So.2d 557 (1963) ; State v. McKrachern, 141 Me. 194, 41 A.2d 817 (1945) ;
Gwaltney v. Morris, 237 Md. 173, 205 A.2d 266 (1964); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 159
Mass. 56, 38 N.E. 111 (1893) ; People v. Ring, 267 Mich. 657, 255 N.W. 373 (1934) ; State
v. Elli, 267 Minn. 185, 125 N.W.2d 738 (1964); Stokes v. State, 240 Miss. 453, 128 So.2d
341 (1961) ; State v. Supinski, 398 S.W.2d 471 (Mo. 1965) ; State v. Walsh, 72 Mont. 110,
232 Pac. 194 (1924) ; Pribyl v. State, 165 Neb. 691, 87 N.W.2d 201 (1957) ; Rainsberger v.
State, 76 Nev. 158, 350 P.2d 995 (1960) ; State v. Peters, 90 N.H. 438, 10 A.2d 242 (1939) ;
State v. Dimadica, 40 N.J. 404, 192 A.2d 825 (1963) ; State v. Romero, 69 N.M. 187, 365
P.2d 58 (1961); People v. Cooke, 292 N.Y. 85, 54 N.E.2d 357 (1944) ; State v. Spencer, 239
N.C. 604, 80 S.E.2d 670 (1954); People v. Mach, 210 Ohio 2d 90, 185 N.E.2d 466 (1962);
Jordan v. State, 327 P.2d 708 (Okla. Crim. 1958); State v. Kendrick, 398 P.2d 471 (Ore.
1965) ; Commonwealth v. Turner, 371 Pa. 417, 88 A.2d 915 (1952) ; State v. Fuller, 227
S.C. 138, 87 S.E.2d 287 (1955); Nance v. State, 210 Tenn. 328, 358 S.W.2d 327 (1962);
Davidson v. State, 386 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Crim. 1965); State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269
Pac. 480 (1928) ; State v. Goyet, 120 Vt. 12, 132 A.2d 623 (1957) ; Near v. Commonwealth,
202 Va. 20, 116 S.E.2d 85 (1960) ; State v. Weaver, 60 Wash. 2d 87, 371 P.2d 1006 (1962) ;
Loose v. State, 120 Wis. 115, 97 N.W. 526 (1903) ; Martinez v. State, 80 Wyo. 325, 342 P.2d
227 (1959).
The federal courts also treat sequestration as discretionary. E.g., Spindler v. United
States, 336 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1964); Del Cristo v. United States, 327 F.2d 208 (5th Cir.
1964) ; United States v. Leggett, 326 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1964) ; Williamson v. United States,
310 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1962).
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cally ruled that sequestration is a right if timely requested.' 7 However,
the majority of courts seldom refuse to grant the rule if it appears that
the ascertainment of truth will be advanced. 8 The rule may be invoked by
the court on its own motion,'9 or on request of either the prosecution 20 or
defense,2' at any time during the proceedings.22 The judge is under no
17. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-1703 (1954), provides:
In all cases either party shall have the right to have the witnesses of the other party
examined out of the hearing of each other ....
In Montos v. State, 212 Ga. 764, 766, 95 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1956), the Georgia Supreme Court
declared:
[Tihe sequestration of witnesses is mandatory upon a timely request by any party,
to the cause, and . . . the refusal of the trial court to grant such request by counsel
for the defendants deprived the defendant of a substantial and positive right.
In Head v. State, 111 Ga. App. 14, 140 S.E.2d 291, 292 (1965), the defendant was convicted
of selling beer without a license. The defendant's motion to exclude from the courtroom two
policemen, who were witnesses, was overruled. The colloquy that appears in the transcript
set out below is worthy of note:
Court: Do you want the rule?
Defense Counsel: Yes, Your Honor, we wish the rule.
Court: Do you have any objection to the officers staying in?
Defense Counsel: Yes, we object to the officers staying in.
Court: They are officers of the court. I will permit them to remain in the courtroom.
On appeal, the court held that a defendant who invokes the sequestration rule has an
absolute right to have the state witnesses excluded from the courtroom. The judge's failure
to enforce the invoking of the rule was reversible error.
18. The Tennessee Supreme Court in Hughes v. State, 126 Tenn. 40, 85, 148 S.W.
543, 555 (1912), indicated that when an affidavit is filed stating sufficient grounds for the
expulsion of the witnesses from the courtroom, the court must exclude them. Accord, e.g.,
Montos v. State, 212 Ga. 764, 95 S.E.2d 792 (1956) ; Hunter v. State, 105 Ga. App. 564, 125
S.E.2d 85 (1962) ; State v. Gardner, 267 Minn. 97, 125 N.W.2d 591 (1963) ; Roberts v.
State, 100 Neb. 99, 158 N.W. 930 (1916) ; State v. Zellers, 7 N.J.L. (1824); State v. Williams,
29 N.J. 27, 148 A.2d 22 (1959); Bishop v. State, 81 Tex. Crim. 96, 194 S.W. 389 (1917).
Cf. Clary v. State, 68 Tex. Crim. 290, 150 S.W. 919 (1912).
In other cases which have held that denial of a sequestration motion is not reversible
error, the courts have stated that such a motion is rarely denied. E.g., Spencer v. State, 133
So.2d 729 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961) ; People v. Reed, 333 Ill. 397, 164 N.E. 847 (1928) ; State v.
Sweet, 101 Kan. 746, 168 Pac. 1112 (1917).
In People v. Cooke, 292 N.Y. 185, 54 N.E.2d 357 (1944), the New York Court of
Appeals held that in New York the exclusion of witnesses is discretionary. The court
stated, however, that it was hard to understand why such a motion should not be granted
as a matter of course.
19. When the defense counsel has requested that the state's witnesses be sequestered, the
judge may also order the accused's witnesses excluded. This is true even when the prosecutor
has announced that he does not care for sequestration of the accused's witnesses. Jones v.
State, 60 Ga. App. 828, 5 S.E.2d 404 (1939). Accord, State v. Kendrick, 398 P.2d 471 (Ore.
1965); State v. Ede, 167 Ore. 640, 117 P.2d 235 (1941).
20. Montos v. State, 212 Ga. 764, 95 S.E.2d 792 (1956); Hodges v. State, 94 Ga. App.
722, 96 S.E.2d 792 (1956) ; State v. McLeod, 131 Mont. 478, 311 P.2d 400 (1957) ; State
v, Wilson, 178 Ore. 193, 164 P.2d 722 (1945).
21. Aden v. State, 237 Ark. 789, 376 S.W.2d 277 (1964); State v. Pikul, 150 Conn.
195, 187 A.2d 442 (1962) ; People v. Reed, 333 Ill. 397, 164 N.E. 847 (1928); People v.
Dixon, 23 Ill. App. 2d 136, 177 N.E.2d 206 (1961); People v. Cooke, 292 N.Y. 185, 54
N.E.2d 357 (1944) ; Love v. State, 319 P.2d 317 (Okla. Crim. 1957).
22. A motion to exclude witnesses from the courtroom made before the introduction of
evidence, but after prosecution's opening statement, was not too late. Rogers v. People, 76
Colo. 181, 230 P.2d 391 (1924).
It has been recognized that a motion for exclusion made during the taking of testimony
is not necessarily too late. People v. Winchester, 52 Ill. 237, 185 N.E. 580 (1933); Clary v.
State, 68 Tex. Crim. 290, 150 S.W. 919 (1912). It should be noted that the better practice is
[VOL. XX
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obligation to invoke the rule sua sponte.? In State v. Gardner,24 the
Minnesota Supreme Court set forth the standard that the courts normally
employ in determining the question of sequestration: "Where evidence
is in sharp conflict on some factual issue such as guilt or innocence of
defendant . . . [a] motion for sequestration should be granted as a
matter of course. '2 5 However, failing or refusing to exclude witness from
the courtroom has generally been held to be reversible error only if
prejudice can be shown. 6
The court may make exceptions to an order of sequestration to
facilitate procedural convenience and the administration of justice. Thus,
experts27 and other persons assisting counsel28 may remain in the court-
to move for sequestration at the beginning of the trial. Martinez v. State, 80 Wyo. 325, 342
P.2d 227 (1959).
23. Brigmon v. Warden, 213 Md. 638, 131 A.2d 245 (1957); Commonwealth v. Boyance,
199 Pa. Super. 204, 184 A.2d 338 (1962).
24. 267 Minn. 97, 125 N.W.2d 591 (1961).
25. Id. at 592.
26. E.g., Holder v. State, 136 Fla. 880, 187 So. 781 (1939) (The court permitted the
owner of the stolen property in question to remain in the courtroom and later testify.);
Young v. State, 99 So.2d 304 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1957) (Error to allow a witness who had read
a copy of prior testimony to subsequently testify.); Montos v. State, 212 Ga. 764, 955
S.E.2d 792 (1956) (Trial court allowed witnesses whose presence were not needed to remain
in the courtroom.) ; People v. Dixon, 23 Ill. App. 2d 136, 177 N.E.2d 206 (1961) (Denial of
timely motion to exclude witnesses on ground that trial judge did not "like to do that"
was reversible error.); Moore v. Commonwealth, 323 S.W.2d 577 (Ky. 1958) (Eyewitnesses
who were all felons and in the penitentiary at the time of the killing, were permitted to
hear each other's testimony.) ; Ray v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 286, 435 S.W. 694 (1931) (In
a homicide prosecution, the court's refusal to exclude witnesses was an abuse of discretion.) ;
State v. Carter, 206 La. 181, 19 So.2d 41 (1941) (In prosecution for attempting to murder
two deputy sheriffs, the court refused to exclude three other deputy sheriffs who were
witnesses.) ; Jones v. State, 185 Md. 481, 45 A.2d 350 (1946) (The court's refusal to grant
defendant's motion to exclude witnesses during a murder prosecution was an abuse of
discretion.); Roberts v. State, 100 Neb. 199, 158 N.W. 930 (1916) (Witnesses for the
prosecution were "near relatives" of another witness for the State.) ; Thompson v. State,
73 Okla. Crim. 72, 118 P.2d 269 (1941) (The court's allowing of prosecution's witnesses to
remain while excluding defendant's witnesses was reversible error.) ; Commonwealth v.
Turner, 371 Pa. 417, 88 A.2d 915 (1952) (Two detectives who heard inculpatory statements
by the accused were each allowed to remain in the courtroom when the other was testifying.) ;
State v. Williams, 266 S.C. 525, 85 S.E.2d 863 (1955) (Defendant's witnesses, who were
prisoners, were allowed to remain in the courtroom when a prison guard testified.) ; Freddy v.
State, 89 Tex. Crim. 53, 229 S.W. 533 (1921) (The brother of the person who the defendant
allegedly shot was allowed to remain in the courtroom and later testify.); Huffman v.
Commonwealth, 185 Va. 524, 39 S.E.2d 291 (1946) (The court gave no reason for denying
defendant's motion for sequestration.).
27. E.g., Michell v. State, 28 Ala. App. 119, 180 So. 119 (1938); People v. Duane, 21
Cal. 2d 71, 130 P.2d 123 (1942) ; Edwards v. State, 55 Ga. App. 187, 189 S.E. 678 (1937) ;
Bow v. People, 160 Ill. 438, 43 N.E. 593 (1890); Romary v. State, 223 Ind. 667, 64 N.E.2d
22 (1945) ; Barnes v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. 111, 117 S.W.2d 441 (1938).
28. State v. Romero, 85 Ariz. 263, 336 P.2d 366 (1959) (A Justice of the Peace present
during the trial was allowed to testify.); People v. Persky, 167 Cal. App. 134, 334 P.2d
219 (1959)(The court permitted two witnesses to remain in the courtroom based on
pertinent facts.) ; Dye v. State, 220 Ga. 113, 137 S.E.2d 465 (1964) (A witness was allowed to
remain in the courtroom upon request of the prosecution.) ; Tanner v. State, 213 Ga. 820, 102
S.E.2d 176 (1958) (The witness was allowed to remain when the Solicitor-General stated
that he needed the witness for advice and assistance.); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 353
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room at the judge's discretion. Police officers2" active in the investigation
of the case have been allowed to remain in the courtroom even though
they had testified or were scheduled to testify. When a witness has
violated a sequestration order, the court may refuse to allow him to
testify. 0
S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1961) (An attorney who was the prosecution's witness was allowed to
remain in the courtroom.); State v. McAllister, 244 La. 42, 150 So.2d 557 (1963) (The
court exempted deputies and the Assistant District Attorney from the rule even though other
deputies and the State Attorney were available for the conduct of the trial.) ; State v. Foster,
349 S.W.2d 922 (Mo. 1961) (The only other place for the witness to stay was cold and
disagreeable.); Jordan v. State, 327 P.2d 708 (Okla. Crim. 1958) (The state witness was
allowed to remain in the courtroom to advise the prosecuting attorney.) ; State v. Kendrick,
398 P.2d 471 (Ore. 1965) (A physician who treated the victim remained in the courtroom.)
State v. Sharpe, 239 S.C. 258, 122 S.E.2d 622 (1961) (Witnesses were allowed to remain in
the courtroom to assist the prosecution.); Alston v. State, 170 Tex. Crim. 17, 338 S.W.2d
723 (1960) (A character witness was exempt from the rule.).
29. People v. Johnson, 24 Cal. Rptr. 871, 207 Cal. App. 2d 794 (1962) (The court
allowed an investigator to remain after a motion for exclusion by the defendant.) ; People v.
Corella, 12 Cal. Rptr. 446, 191 Cal. App. 2d 115 (1961) (A police officer was allowed to
remain to advise the District Attorney.); Edwards v. People, 151 Colo. 262, 377 P.2d 399
(1962) (A police officer who remained in the courtroom after the rule was invoked, was later
allowed to testify.) ; Jordan v. People, 151 Colo. 133, 376 P.2d 699 (1962) (An officer present
in the courtroom testified on rebuttal.); People v. Miller, 26 Ill. 2d 305, 186 N.E.2d 317
(1962) (A police officer was allowed to remain in the courtroom.) ; People v. Carter, 24 Ill. 2d
413, 182 N.E.2d 197 (1962) (In a burglary case, the police officer was exempted from the
rule.); People v. Chennault, 24 Ill. 2d 185, 181 N.E.2d 74 (1962) (The court allowed a
police officer to remain and corroborate the testimony of another witness.) ; Epps v. State, 244
Ind. 515, 192 N.E.2d 459 (1963) (The police officer was allowed to remain in the courtroom
after a sequestration order and later testify.) ; State v. Palmer, 227 La. 691, 80 So.2d 374
(1955) (Sheriffs, who were witnesses, had duties to perform in the courtroom.); Baker v.
State, 306 P.2d 344 (Okla. Crim. 1957) (A police officer, who was a material witness was
allowed to remain in the courtroom.) ; Halley v. State, 366 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Crim. 1963)
(Three highway patrolmen who apprehended the defendant were excluded from the rule.);
State v. Weaver, 60 Wash. 2d 87, 371 P.2d 1006 (1962) (A police officer was allowed to
remain so that he could confer with the prosecutor during the trial.).
30. United States v. Bostic, 327 F.2d 983 (6th Cir. Ohio 1964) (A violation of the
court order excluding witnesses was not willful.) ; People v. Kroegen, 37 Cal. Rptr. 593,
61 Cal. App. 2d 236, 390 P.2d 369 (1964) (Member of press who remained in the courtroom
after sequestration order was allowed to testify.) ; People v. Garner, 18 Cal. Rptr. 40, 57
Cal. App. 2d 135, 367 P.2d 680 (1961) (The court reporter was allowed to testify in violation
of the exclusionary rule.) ; Cruz v. People, 149 Colo. 187, 368 P.2d 774 (1962) (The District
Attorney interviewed several witnesses in a group contrary to the court's exclusionary order.) ;
Scoggins v. State, 98 Ga. App. 360, 106 S.E.2d 39 (1958) (While disobedience of the sequestra-
tion rule may be punishable by contempt, it does not render testimony of such witnesses
incompetent as a matter of law.) ; Nance v. State, 210 Tenn. 328, 358 S.W.2d 327 (1962)
(A witness who was barred from the courtroom was later allowed to testify as a rebuttal
witness.).
Other cases have held that when the defendant is not to blame, a defense witness will
generally be permitted to testify even though he has violated the rule. E.g., Brannon v.
State, 16 Ala. App. 259, 76 So. 991 (1917); People v. Glasser, 34 Cal. App. 541, 168 Pac.
157 (1917) ; Boatmyer v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 473, 20 S.W. 1102 (1893).
It has also been held that once the rule is in effect, it is binding on both parties and the
court. Hunter v. State, 105 Ga. App. 564, 125 S.E.2d 85 (1962); Rice v. Commonwealth,
387 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. 1965).
Other courts have indicated that allowing rule violators to testify is entirely discretionary
with the court. E.g., Beddow v. State, 39 Ala. App. 29, 96 So.2d 175 (1956); Teague v.




Since the adoption of the sequestration of witnesses rule by American
courts,"' Florida has been confronted with a number of cases dealing
with the subject.82 In accordance with the majority view, the Florida
decisions treat sequestration not as a right but as a matter entirely within
the discretion of the court.3" The Florida Supreme Court in Spencer v.
State, 4 exemplifies the Florida view:
The rule in Florida . . . is that the trial judge is endowed with
a sound judicial discretion to decide whether particular prospec-
tive witnesses should be excluded from the so-called sequestra-
tion of witnesses rule. Ordinarily, when requested by either side,
the trial judge will exclude all prospective witnesses from the
courtroom during the trial .... Unless a trial judge can be said
to have abused the discretion which is his to exercise in such
situations, then his judgment will not be disturbed. The burden
is on the complaining party to demonstrate an abuse of dis-
cretion with resultant injury.
85
The court distinguished the instant case from Spencer v. State.36
In Spencer the defendant requested the exclusion from the courtroom
of two deputy sheriffs who had a major part in the investigation of the
crime and who were scheduled to testify. The trial court's denial of this
motion was held not to be an abuse of discretion. In the case at bar,
3 7
the testimony of the witness was actually suggested by what he heard
in the courtroom.38 However, in Spencer the supreme court based its
decision on the premise that deputy sheriffs are law enforcement officers
"whose interests in the result is not apt to be personal.1 30 If this rationale
was applied to the detective in the instant case, the court could have
readily reached the same result. The decision in the present case sig-
nificantly indicates the recent emphasis given by the courts to the Con-
stitutional rights of an accused to a fair and impartial trial. Nevertheless,
the court sought to justify its decision to comport with the Florida
There are numerous instances where a violator of the rule has not been allowed to testify.
E.g., Lynn v. State, 37 Ala. App. 400, 69 So.2d 485 (1954); Rowe v. State, 120 Fla. 649,
163 So. 22 (1935); Mcgee v. Commonwealth, 246 Ky. 445, 55 S.W.2d 382 (1932); State v.
Pearson, 224 La. 393, 69 So.2d 512 (1953); Mallett v. State, 143 Tex. Crim. 424, 158 S.W.2d
792 (1942).
31. See cases supra note 9.
32. See 32 FLA. JUR. Trial § 14 (1960).
33. E.g., West v. State, 149 Fla. 436, 6 So.2d 7 (1942); Holder v. State, 136 Fla. 880,
187 So. 781 (1939) ; Lang v. State, 137 Fla. 128, 187 So. 786 (1938); Cason v. State, 86
Fla. 276, 97 So. 720 (1923); Robinson v. State, 80 Fla. 736, 87 So. 61 (1920); Sylvester v.
State, 46 Fla. 166, 35 So. 142 (1903) ; Spencer v. State, 133 So.2d 729 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961);
Young v. State, 99 So.2d 304 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1957).
34. 133 So.2d 729 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
35. Id. at 731.
36. Supra note 34.
37. Jackson v. State, 177 So.2d 353 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
38. [T]he testimony ... resulted in evidence of an alleged confession which evidence
if accepted by the jury is the most damaging of all possible evidence to a defendant
in a criminal trial. Id. at 355.
39. Supra note 34 at 731.
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Supreme Court's holding in Spencer.4° It is quite conceivable that had
Spencer been decided today, its result would be identical with that of
the instant case.
Aside from the question of abuse, there is the consideration of
whether it is wise for sequestration to be discretionary with the court
rather than to be granted as a matter of right. The exclusion of witnesses
is obviously desirable for any effect it may have in preventing perjurious
testimony. 4' The major advantage of the current discretionary policy
is that its flexibility facilitates the smooth administration of the trial. 2
However, no law should be laid down which could possibly deprive an
accused of the opportunity to prevent or expose perjury. This author
believes that the court in Jackson considered the rights of the accused
as paramount; and, if more courts followed this attitude it would furnish
the impetus necessary to make sequestration mandatory or demandable
as a matter of right. In summation, the words of Professor Wigmore
seem quite appropriate:
But when all allowances are made, it remains true that the
expedient of sequestration is one of the greatest engines that
the skill of man has ever invented for the detection of liars
in a court of justice .... Sequestration can never ... do serious
harm to those who have invoked it.48
JACK L. HERSKOWITZ
40. It is noteworthy that in Spencer v. State, supra note 34, there was even stronger
justification for holding that the trial court had abused its discretion. There, the court allowed
two witnesses (deputy sheriffs) who were scheduled to testify, to remain and hear each
other's testimony. In the instant case, the detective, who ultimately was allowed to testify,
was not even scheduled to be a witness.
41. See notes 13, 14, and 15 supra.
42. See notes 27, 28, and 29 supra.
43. 6 WIrmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1838 (3d ed. 1940).
